This paper examines Marx's views on globalization and its supposed inevitability, and contends that they underwent a substantial evolution and revision after the publication of the Communist Manifesto. In the case of China, a prime example of the Asiatic mode of production, Marx even doubted whether globalization (capitalism) would ever be able to accomplish its historical mission of developing the forces of production and creating the material conditions for a higher mode of production, viz., Communism. While in the Russian case, he seriously entertained the notion that it could bypass the hardships and vicissitudes of capitalism and forge its own unique path to socialism. If accepted, this interpretation represents a serious challenge to the universality and validity of Marx's materialist conception of history.
I. Introduction.
In recent years, several Marxian scholars have argued that the rapid integration of goods and financial markets (globalization) the world economy has experienced since the demise of the Soviet Union and its satellites is vindication of Marx and Engels' prescient analysis in the Communist Manifesto, Capital, and in their works addressing colonial matters, written more than a hundred fifty years ago (see Clarke, 2000; Dupuy, 1998; Foster, 2000; Jellison and Gottheil, 2009; Moseley 1997 and 2009; and Sutcliffe, 2002) .
Moreover, the main underlying economic reason given for the geographical expansion of capitalism (away from Western Europe and England in particular) into a global system has been attributed, primarily, to Marx's much maligned -law of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall‖ (see Jellison and Gottheil, op. cit.; and Mosely, op.cit.) .
This paper does not necessarily take issue with the contention that the [early] Marx and
Engels's believed that the ultimate victory of socialism was predicated on the universalization [and necessity] of capitalism 1 , but contends that the more mature [and late] Marx had significantly revised his views on both the inevitability of capitalist globalization in the non-European world and whether capitalism, independent of its inevitability, was ultimately necessary for the victory of socialism. That is, Marx came to the conclusion that historical development, particularly in the Asian and Russian cases, was much more multi-lineal than he had thought [based on his earlier analysis of how capitalism had developed in Western Europe and England]. 2 Thus, any interpretation which ignores this important development in Marx's thinking is both incomplete and misleading when applied to the historical reality of non-European societies.
It is argued below that Marx's views on the process of globalization (imperialism in former times) in the non-European world, particularly the so-called Asiatic mode of 1 Marx (1848) declares in -On the Question of Free Trade‖ that he is against the -protective system‖ of his day because it is -conservative,‖ and he is reluctantly in favor of the free trade system [which he equates with the complete ‗freedom of capital' to move across national boundaries] because it -…is destructive [progressive] . It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point… All the destructive phenomena which unlimited competition gives rise to within a country are reproduced in more gigantic proportions on the world market. In a word, the free trade system hastens social revolution‖ (p. 450). And by social revolution Marx clearly meant a Communist revolution because as he states in the CM, -All the preceding classes…sought to fortify their already acquired status by subjecting society to their conditions of appropriation. The proletarians cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also Towards the end of the article entitled, -The Future Results of British Rule in India,‖ where he had earlier observed that -The railway system will therefore become, in India, truly the forerunner of modern industry,‖ he also informs the reader that he -cannot part with the subject of India‖ without making some concluding remarks which, given their telling nature, are worth quoting in full,
The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. They are the defenders of property, but did any revolutionary party ever originate agrarian revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay? Did they not, in India, to borrow an expression of that great robber, Lord Clive himself, resort to atrocious extortion, when simple corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity? While they prated in Europe about the inviolable sanctity of the national debt, did they not confiscate in India the dividends of the rajahs, who had invested their private savings in the Company's own funds? While they combated the French revolution under the pretext of defending -our holy religion,‖ did they not forbid, at the same time, Christianity to be propagated in India, and did they not, in order to make money out of the pilgrims streaming to the temples of Orissa and Bengal, take up the trade in the murder and prostitution perpetrated in the temple of Juggernaut? These are the men of ‗Property, Order, Family, and Religion (2007 [August 8, 1853] , p. 224).
Marx viewed the wholesale and forcible destruction of -primitive‖ societies, such as those of India and China, as necessary and progressive because he believed that the Asian mode of production did not have -a history‖ in the sense that Western European civilization did. 4 He believed that Asian societies lacked internal dialectal forces, viz., classes and class conflict, capable of generating progressive historical change (development of the productive forces and the creation of new property relations of production) in the manner that feudalism's decay created propitious economic conditions for the growth of the bourgeois mode of production in Western Europe. For example, insofar as India is concerned, he writes that, India then could not escape the fate of being conquered, and the whole of her past history, if it be anything, is the history of the successive conquests she has undergone. Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history is but the history of the successive invaders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society. The question, therefore, is not whether the English had the right to conquer India, but whether we are to prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton (1853, pp. 219-20).
Marx held a similar (stereotypical) view with respect to China in an article published in the German newspaper Die Presse (July 7, 1862) entitled, -Chinese Affairs,‖ where he discusses the nature of the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) against Manchu colonial rule.
Some time before the tables began to dance, China--this living fossil-started revolutionizing. By itself there was nothing extraordinary in this phenomenon since, the Oriental empires always show an unchanging social infrastructure coupled with unceasing change in the persons and tribes who manage to ascribe to themselves the political superstructure. the Globalization‖ process …will create out of an economically diverse set of nations a ‗unified whole,' more humane than any of its parts had ever been‖ (ibid.). Clearly, this is echoed by Marx's own words in the CM where he declares in no uncertain terms that, -The Bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most backward, nations into civilization… it compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois. In one word, it creates a world in its own image‖ (p. 64; see also his remarks above -On the Question of Free Trade,‖ op. cit). Further, Marx believed that once capitalism takes hold of a society it -…ruthlessly forces the human race to produce for production's sake; [it] … forces the development of the productive powers of society, and creates the material conditions, which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle‖ (Capital I, p. 592).
It is evident that the Marx of the CM viewed capitalist globalization as both inevitable and necessary [even desirable] for the ultimate attainment of human freedom or communism. However, Marx's more mature writings on Asia suggest that capitalist globalization, far from being inevitable, would be a highly uneven and protracted process that, under certain conditions, particularly in the case of China, might never take place owing to the nature and resilience of the Asiatic mode of production. In Marx's mind, the Asiatic mode of production stood uneasily [and inconsistently] apart, both geographically and conceptually, from the other Western-based modes of production that formed integral parts of his materialist conception of history, viz., -the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois methods [modes] of production‖ he so aptly describes in the Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859) [see Avineri, 1969] . The Asiatic mode, as opposed to the feudal or bourgeois, did not possess an endogenous mechanism of change via class formation and conflict that would destroy the existing (property) relations of production of one mode of production, say feudalism, and replace it with new and better suited ones to the advancing technology, thus paving the way for the further development of society's forces of production; in other words, it was incapable of generating capitalism from within. 5 5 It is admittedly puzzling that, except for a few insightful remarks regarding the similarity between Japan's feudal organization of landed property and that of Western Europe during the middle ages in a footnote in Capital, Vol. I, p. 718, Marx had next to nothing to say about Japan's successful defensive modernization which began under the (late) Tokugawa dynasty (1853-1867) and was intensified under the Meiji Restoration 473-4; and Brewer, 1990, pp. 53-57] . These special and unique set of historical, institutional, and geographic factors led Marx to conclude that the resilience of the Asiatic mode of production might be strong enough to prevent globalization of the Asiatic mode of production. For further details, see Avineri (1969, pp. 254-550; and Baran (1957, Chp. V) . 6 Both Brewer (1990) and Avineri (1969) are of the opinion that, among his contemporaries, Marx's knowledge of Indian (and Chinese) society was unsurpassed when it came to historical and institutional detail, and also in terms of outlining the long-run impact of European imperialism on the socio-economic structure of these colonies. See also Howard and King (1985) .
(imperialism) from accomplishing its historical mission as the following passage from his article -Trade with China‖ (1858) attests, It is this same combination of husbandry with manufacturing industry, which, for a long time, withstood, and still checks, the export of British wares to East India; but there that combination was based upon a peculiar combination of the landed property which the British, in their position as the supreme landlords of the country, had it in their power to undermine, and thus forcibly convert part of the Hindoo self-sustaining communities into mere farms, producing opium, cotton, indigo, hemp, and other raw materials, in exchange for British stuffs. In China, manufacturers could not penetrate and undersell -cloth woven by hand in the most primitive looms‖ stemmed from the unique ability of these self-sufficient Chinese villages to combine and coordinate their family labor, old and young, during the agricultural off-season not only to card and spin the cotton into yarn, but also to weave it into homespun stuff (cloth) with which -nine out of every ten beings in this country are clothed‖ (ibid., p. 45). 7 Moreover, the village's possession (not ownership) of land and the instruments of production, both privately and in common, including a loom in -every well-conditioned homestead,‖ enabled them to avoid being undercut by -the most advanced factory system of the world‖ (ibid.) 8 In other words, Marx attributed the resilience of these Chinese villages to the fact that the direct producers controlled their own means of production (including common possession of land) and, equally as important, they were able to effectively pool and coordinate the village's agricultural labor when it was slack (during the off-season) with handicraft (cloth) production. 10 In Notebook V, -The Chapter on Capital‖ of the Grundrisse, Marx makes essentially the same point. He declares that -The Asiatic form necessarily hangs on most tenaciously and for the longest time. This is due to the presupposition that the individual does not become independent vis-à-vis the commune; that there is a self-sustaining cycle of production, unity of agriculture and manufactures, etc. If the individual changes his relation to the commune, he thereby changes and acts destructively upon the commune; as on its economic presupposition‖ (1973 [1858] , p. 486; for similar remarks, see Capital I, p. 357-8; and Notebook IV, [1857-58] , pp. 472-475). Finally, Marx in TSV, Part III, discusses in several instances the essential difference between the European feudal mode of production and the Asiatic mode in terms of ownership of land, mobility of labor [and capital], intensity and duration of work, and the -revolutionary‖ role played by usury in the disintegration of the feudal mode of production but not in the Asiatic case; for example, he notes that -Usury can continue to exist for a long time in Asiatic forms of society without bringing about real disintegration, but merely giving rise to economic decay and political corruption‖ (p. 531; see also pp. 420, [422] [423] and 444; and Capital III, .
considerable continuity, if not always consistency, in Marx's views on the nature of the Asiatic mode of production and the ability (or better still, inability) of British capitalism to penetrate and subjugate it.
The obstacles presented by the internal solidity and organization of pre-capitalist, national modes of production to the corrosive influence of commerce are strikingly illustrated in the intercourse of the English with India and China. The broad basis of the mode of production here is formed by the unity of small-scale agriculture and home industry, to which in India we should add the form of village communities built upon the common ownership [possession] of land, which…was the original form in China as well. In India the English lost no time in exercising their direct political and economic power…English commerce exerted a revolutionary influence on these communities and tore them apart only in so far as the low prices of its goods served to destroy spinning and weaving industries…And even so this work of dissolution proceeds very gradually [my emphasis]. And still more slowly in China, where it is not reinforced by direct political power [my emphasis]. The substantial economy and saving in time afforded by the association of agriculture with manufacture put up a stubborn resistance to the products of the big industries, whose prices include the faux frais of the circulation process which pervaded them (pp. 333-34).
Of course, if one accepts Marx's reluctant conclusion that these self-sufficient hereditary village communities are not going to disappear anytime soon (if ever) as he hoped they would, then as Avineri (1969) 11 It should be noted that Avineri's seminal essay relies almost exclusively on Marx's dispatches from the New York Tribune and it is not evident that he was even aware of the extensive nature (and continuity) of Marx's writings on the subject in Capital, the Grundrisse, and TSV, Part III. This essay attempts to fill this lacunae in the extant literature by establishing the continuity and evolution of Marx's thought on this highly important and controversial topic. In more ways than one, Marx's analysis of the Asiatic mode of production and its resilience in terms of blocking the advance of capitalism provides the basis for the pathbreaking works by P.P. Rey and C. Arrighi during the 1970s on the articulation (co-existence) of different modes of production (indigenous and capitalist) within a given (concrete) social formation in tropical Africa in the early twentieth century (Congo-Brazzaville and Rhodesia [Zimbabwe], respectively). Both authors extensively document that the relatively late penetration of capitalism into Africa was blocked or arrested for such a long time that the transition from one mode of production (tribal communal) to another (capitalist) became the -normal state of affairs‖ (for further details, see Brewer, op. cit., .
In similar vein, Howard and King (1989) suggest that the late Marx, influenced by the Russian populists, no longer accepted the universality of capitalism (globalization) as a precondition for socialism, and took seriously the idea that, once capitalism had been established in Western Europe and England, it was possible for Russia (a semi-Asiatic country in his mind) to forge a unique non-capitalist path to socialism led by the peasantry and intellectuals, rather than the revolutionary proletariat. Howard The Communist Manifesto had, as its object, the proclamation of the inevitable impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property. But in Russia we find, faceto-face with the rapidly flowering capitalist swindle and bourgeois property, just beginning to develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: can the Russian obshchina though greatly undermined, yet a form of primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of Communist common ownership? Or, on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution such as constitutes the historical evolution of the West? The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for a communist development (January 21, 1882).
Marx, anticipating Gerschenkron's (1965) as it evolved in Western Europe and no longer believed, if he ever did, that a -one-sizefits-all‖ explanation was suitable for understanding the emergence of capitalism and its metamorphosis into a higher mode of production, particularly when it came to the Asiatic or semi-Asiatic modes of production prevalent in India, China, and Russia.
III. Conclusion
This paper has shown that Marx's views on globalization and its supposed inevitability underwent a substantial evolution and revision, even as early as five years after the publication of the Communist Manifesto. In his writings relating to India, and particularly China and Russia, Marx is no longer certain that -the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future‖ (Vol. I, p. 13).
In the case of China, a prime example of the Asiatic mode of production, he even doubted whether capitalist globalization would ever be able to accomplish its historical mission of developing the forces of production and creating the material conditions for a higher mode of production, viz., Communism. While in the Russian case, a semi-Asiatic country in his mind, he seriously entertained the notion, towards the end of his life, that it could bypass the hardships and vicissitudes of capitalism and forge its own unique path to socialism provided that it received help from a proletarian-led revolution in Western Europe. That is, the ultimate victory of socialism, although conditional in nature, was no longer predicated on the prior universalization of capitalism. These are no small matters, for, if accepted, they represent a serious challenge to the universality and validity of Marx's materialist conception of history: the idea that each historical stage, say capitalism, grows dialectically out of the internal contradictions (tensions) of the previous stage, feudalism, and so on.
